3 July 1953

THE RULE BANK HARRISHES

SUBJECT: Comments on Technical That Cross Meeting on Satellite

Tracking Comerce on 1 July 198

REFERENCE: Commerce Managements FC-4820-CFV of 1 July 1992 on above

subject

1. With respect to Mr. Heading's statement as set forth in the referenced memorandum (see first puregraph under B-1 of referenced memorandum), Mr. Meading also made the point that these cameras could geodetically position extellites, which would appear to have strategic usefulness. He did not say as reported in the referenced memorandum that the provision of these cameras represented a break through for the Russians but did say that it could represent a saving of time of perhaps as such as three years in Seviet development of a similar camera.

2. The last paragraph under R-1 of the referenced agnorandus reads as follows:

In reference to the commercian being a technical gain by the USSE (Air Force memorandum), Mr. Tausay stated that there were only five people in the world that were capable of producing these less and that one of them was a lusaism.

The above paragraph implies that there would not be a technical pain to the UEER in providing them with the esseras. While Mr. Thereby's statement that one of the people capable of producing these lens is a Russian is apparently true, it is my understanding that despite this capability the development of the lens without specifications would involve considerable research time on the part of the Soviet. D/GP confirms that this is also their understanding.

3. There appeared to be general agreement at the meeting that whether or not strategic use we descripted, these cases represented a scientific achievement that the foriet would be pleased to have end en adequate quid pro quo should be esseted should their export be authorized. The quid pro quo suggested varied from the BY peoples' suggestion that providing these cases would engender good will leading to an exchange of information (including the data developed by the Soviet with these cases to suggestions that we should receive similar Soviet equipment as proposed by the DOD. (The minutes of the Informal Working Group on BY dated 2) has 1953 suggest possible quid pro que; paragraph 1-b).

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- 4. My evaluation of the statements made at the macking might be supported as follows:
 - a. The essents connot be used difficiently for the detection of missiles (guided or tanguided) learnched by a hostile country.
 - b. While those commons represent the best method of fixing a very small sabellite with respect to its position ever the earth's surface, there are at least equally efficient methods for so fixing larger satellites.
 - c. The Strategic significance of these cameras with respect to offunite or definate warfare has not been denoted strated; scientific significance has been denoted; scientific significance has been denoted;
 - d. A guid pro quo might be cancted from the Soviet in connection with the prevision of these conserns to them. Subject to the determination by those qualified to judge what represents adequate quid pro quo and its successful negotiation, the export of the consens to the Soviet could be justified as in the best interests of the United States.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000200090023-2

Area Records Officer, ORR

27 June 1958

THRU : Chief, D/S

Acting Chief, S/TD

Destruction of Records, (4th Quarter Fiscal Year 1958) Reports of

No records were destroyed by S/TD during the fourth quarter of the fiscal year 1958.

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